In this paper, we explore the demand for risk adjustment by health plans that contract with private employers by considering the conditions under which plans might value risk adjustment. Three factors reduce the value of risk adjustment from the plans' point of view. First, only a relatively small segment of privately insured Americans face a choice of competing health plans. Second, health plans share much of their insurance risk with payers, providers, and reinsurers. Third, de facto experience rating that occurs during the premium negotiation process and management of coverage appear to substitute for risk adjustment. While the current environment has not generated much demand for risk adjustment, we reflect on its future potential.
If the de facto model of health care financing in the United States has become managed competition (Enthoven 1993) , why do so few private purchasers of health insurance make use of formal risk adjustment methods in paying health plans (Keenan et al. 2001) ? In theoretical models, risk adjustment has been identified as an essential component in making insurance markets work efficiently (see, among other things, Newhouse 1996; Selden 1998) . For purchasers, risk adjustment plays a central role in reducing incentives for health plans to orient competition toward avoiding the enrollment of ''bad risks,'' in the insurance sense (Newhouse 1996) .
Managed competition depends upon competitive markets for health insurance. The logic of managed competition relies upon employers creating financial incentives for employees to make efficient decisions in their choice of health plan, and for health plans to be efficient in the delivery of care. Enrollees may be asked to pay the full cost of premium differences for plans that cost more than a so-called benchmark plan. This mechanism is meant to encourage enrollees to assess the value of different features offered by competing health plans. The use of capitation payments to reimburse health plans creates an incentive for plans to minimize health care spending. Offering enrollees a choice among plans creates an offsetting incentive because plans must compete on the basis of quality to attract and retain enrollees. This combination of features is posited to result in an efficient balancing of cost and quality. Biased selection, however, threatens the logic of the model by shifting the focus of competition from quality and efficiency to risk selection (Cutler and Reber 1998) . The theory of managed competition, as it is usually set out, implies that employers seeking to organize markets for health plans should be interested in using a formula to risk adjust premiums so as to attenuate selection-related incentives. This line of argument focuses on the employer/purchaser and what could be called the ''supply'' of formal risk adjustment.
In this paper, we consider the demand for riskadjusted payments by health plans. In narrowing our focus to the contract between a health plan and an employer, we exclude from consideration issues related to formal risk adjustment of employee contributions or payments from the plan to providers. These are important issues in their own right, but are not discussed here. We begin by exploring the demand for formal risk adjustment and identifying the conditions under which risk adjustment may be valued by plans. We assess each of the key conditions in terms of their significance in existing markets for health plans. Next, we consider alternative strategies for plans facing an adverse selection problem that threatens their profitability. Our analysis of the demand for formal risk adjustment leads us to conclusions concerning whether strategies to expand the use of formal risk adjustment might be justified. In particular, we consider whether the current equilibrium in which employers have circumvented the need for formal risk adjustment through alternative mechanisms might be improved upon if risk adjustment technology improved beyond its current state.
The Demand for Formal Risk Adjustment
We are concerned with explaining the limited use of formal risk adjustment methods-techniques that prospectively adjust payments based on the characteristics of an enrolled population-as contrasted with all methods of adjusting for risk. We do not include in this discussion the common underwriting practice in which plans charge higher premiums for certain small or medium-sized employer groups because of the overall risk profile of the group. Nor do we include in the definition of formal risk adjustment the informal, retrospective methods that plans and employers use to share higher-than-expected costs (in fact, we argue that these methods in part explain the absence of true risk adjustment). Finally, it is important to note that formal risk adjustment methods allocate a fixed sum of money among health plans, so that there are both winners and losers (relative to the default of no risk adjustment) among the plans that contract with a given employer.
We view a health plan as a risk neutral, profit-maximizing firm. For our purposes, profit maximization with risk neutrality implies that formal risk adjustment is valued by health plans because of its potential to increase a plan's net revenue. These assumptions are relatively innocuous and could be relaxed without affecting the central themes of our analysis. 1 We emphasize here that a health plan's objectives are not equivalent to those of purchasers or regulators. In particular, health plans are concerned only with private efficiency linked to profit maximization, and are interested in redistributive payment policies only if they are likely to benefit via higher earnings. Therefore, individual plan interests in payment policies often may conflict with employer interests in ''socially efficient'' insurance markets. There are three conditions necessary for formal risk adjustment to increase a plan's expected net revenue. 2 First, a plan must share in the costs of caring for covered populations through the payment system. The actual payment system may be a form of capitation or a mixed payment system (Ellis and McGuire 1986) , so long as health plan profits are negatively affected by health care costs over some range. Without cost sharing, a plan's net revenue is not affected by the risk profile of enrollees. Second, a plan must compete for enrollees (i.e., enrollees must have a choice of plans). In the absence of competition for enrollees, there is no biased selection and thus no redistribution from risk adjustment. 3 Third, a plan must believe that it will attract an adverse selection of consumers. This belief may be derived from experience with similar populations, past experience with the same population, knowledge of consumer cost-sharing rules (e.g., fixed contribution), and information about competing plans. If a plan expects to be selected by a disproportionately healthy group of enrollees compared to its competitor(s), then selection does not pose a problem from the plan's perspective.
It is particularly important to point out that aside from beliefs, the necessary conditions discussed previously are largely exogenous to the plan. ''Market structure'' in the managed competition model is a choice of the purchaser. Private purchasers decide whether to enter into a sole source contract with a health plan or to allow enrollees to choose among two or more carriers. Purchasers are also primarily responsible for choosing the method of paying health plans, although some of the details (e.g., risk sharing for outlier cases) may be subject to negotiation. This is certainly true for the deci-292 sion to purchase an insured product, which by definition involves shifting most claims' risk to the plan, versus self-insuring, which usually involves little or no risk to the plan. As we will discuss subsequently, the decision to self-insure has a number of economic consequences, given regulatory and tax arrangements, that may matter more to purchasers than potential selection effects.
Suppose all three of the ''necessary'' conditions have been met. If a health plan believes that it is likely to face an adverse selection of an employer's risks, the plan can respond by taking various actions, each of which carries different costs and benefits. First, the plan can influence the risk profile of consumers through benefit design, or via administrative mechanisms that affect access to care and quality if benefit design is fixed by the employer. 4 Second, the plan can make a case to the payer within the negotiation process to align premiums to costs stemming from adverse selection (or any other cause). Finally, the plan can request that premiums be adjusted prospectively based on the characteristics of the enrolled population-in other words, the plan can demand formal risk adjustment. Formal risk adjustment will be preferred only when it is the most cost-effective means of increasing the plan's average revenue given the presence of an adverse selection problem.
In what follows, we examine the demand for formal risk adjustment by reviewing the evidence on the three necessary conditions for a profit-maximizing plan to consider risk adjustment potentially valuable. We then assess the alternatives to formal risk adjustment and evidence from interviews and other sources as to their relative effectiveness and cost.
Our review leads to four main observations about current market conditions and the demand for formal risk adjustment. First, only a relatively small segment of privately insured Americans faces a choice of health plans (Marquis and Long 1999b) . Second, health plans share much of their insurance risk with payers, providers, and reinsurers. Third, the process of negotiation between purchasers and health plans over premiums and other plan features frequently results in a de facto form of experience rating, which may be as effective and less costly than existing methods of formal risk adjustment. Fourth, plans and sponsors may alter the risk profile of enrollees by making changes to the benefit design of a plan. Plans also may alter other less visible rationing mechanisms, such as utilization management practices, to the same effect. These measures may be less costly or preferable to formal risk adjustment because of concerns about ''adverse retention'' (Cutler and Reber 1998) . All four of these phenomena tend to reduce health plans' demand for formal risk adjustment.
Necessary Conditions for Adverse Selection to Pose a Problem to a Plan
We noted earlier that the existence of demand for formal risk adjustment will depend on two features of managed competition: 1) that enrollees have a choice of health plan, and 2) that a health plan bears substantial (or at least some) risk for claims costs. To explore whether these conditions exist, we review evidence on the prevalence of enrollee choice of carrier and the amount of risk borne by health plans.
The third necessary condition for a plan to demand formal risk adjustment is its anticipation that it will be selected by sicker-than-average enrollees. For this to be health plans' primary explanation for the lack of demand for formal risk adjustment, we would have to believe that in nearly all cases 5 plans expect that they will attract average or healthier-than-average-enrollees. Because it seems implausible that so few plans in multiple-choice situations would view themselves as attracting sicker-than-average enrollees, we rule this out as an explanation for the lack of demand for formal risk adjustment.
Evidence on Choice of Carrier among Enrollees with Employer-Sponsored Coverage
While the widespread impression is that managed competition has come to dominate health policy in the United States, there is growing evidence that strict implementation of the model in the private sector has been limited. The Robert Wood Johnson Employer Health Insurance Survey, with a 60% response rate among a national sample of employers, documented this phenomenon. This study found that only about 8% of private employers offered any choice of health plans (carriers) 6 to their employees in 1997 (Marquis and Long 1999b) . 7 Because larger firms are more likely to offer choice, this means that about 23% of employees were offered a choice among competing plans. 8, 9 Most employers do not give employees a financial incentive to choose a lower-cost plan. While such incentives are not necessary for selection to occur, they almost surely contribute to the extent of the problem. The importance of employee cost sharing is magnified over time, as products experiencing adverse selection become more costly through experience rating. Among private employers that offered choice among plans in 1997, about 60% of them gave employees financial incentives to choose a lower-cost plan either through a fixed or proportional employer contribution (Marquis and Long 1999b) . Thus only about 15% of all private employees have an incentive to choose plans based on price.
Among public employees, who are about 19% of the workforce, the picture is considerably different. Nearly all federal employees who are eligible for health insurance coverage have a choice of health plans, while 70% of state and local employees are offered such choices (Long and Marquis 1999) . Federal employees receive a fixed contribution from the government to pay for their health insurance, leaving them to pay the full cost of choosing a more expensive plan. About 42% of state and local government employees must pay the full marginal cost of their health plan choice.
Evidence on Share of Claims Risk Held by Plans
Capitation payment represents an important element of managed care. There is, however, a large class of contracts that by law must involve less than full risk shifting to health plans. These contracts, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ER-ISA), are those that cover employees and dependents of self-insured companies. These contracts are often for administrative services only (e.g., utilization management, claims processing, network management) and thereby involve no claims risk; in a minority of cases, a plan's risk is limited by risk corridors or stoploss provisions.
To avoid the cost of state regulations and premium taxes, a significant minority of employers have chosen to self-insure since the passage of ERISA, which exempts self-insured plans from state law regulating the business of insurance. According to one 1997 study of employers in seven states, 13% of firms offered a self-insured plan (Marquis and Long 1999a) . Because large, multistate firms are the most likely to self-insure, the share of employees enrolled in a selfinsured plan-about 33% in 1997-is considerably higher than the share of firms.
Self-insured firms sometimes rely on mechanisms other than administrative-services-only contracts with health plans. Unfortunately, detailed information on risk-sharing contracts under ERISA plans is not available in the literature. The best approximation may be the share of self-insured products that are health maintenance organizations (HMOs)-these would seem to be the products most likely to involve some risk sharing between the plan and the employer.
In 1997, about 15% of employers that provided selfinsured plans offered at least one self-insured HMO product to their employees and their dependents (Marquis and Long 1999a) . These data suggest that even where health plan choices are offered to enrollees, many plans face only a small amount of risk for claims costs.
Capitation and risk sharing with providers. Contracts between health plans and providers offer another vehicle for spreading risk associated with managed care contracts. In the extreme, if plans pay for all services using capitation payments, then they are effectively retaining only an administrative fee for themselves and delegating the risk (insurance function) to providers. Partial or ''soft'' capitation, on the other hand, mitigates a plan's risk by requiring that providers share in some of the variation in costs due to selection (and all other causes of cost risk). Moreover, providers that share risk have incentives to try to control costs, which may attenuate the consequences of adverse selection relative to those that would accrue under a fee-for-service reimbursement system.
In some mature managed care markets, risk sharing with medical groups, independent practice associations, integrated delivery systems, and other large provider organizations is a common feature of reimbursement contracts. In California, for example, capitation is the most common payment arrangement for compensating physician organizations for professional and ancillary services . Nationally, about half of HMOs use capitation as the principal method of paying for primary care services ). The implication is that under the ''delegated model'' of HMO contracting, plans share a substantial amount of risk with provider organizations.
Reinsurance practices of health plans. When health plans accept risk from employers, many limit their risk exposure by purchasing specific (tied to an individual enrollee's claims) or aggregate stop-loss insurance, known as reinsurance. Regulatory reports from Wisconsin and Pennsylvania indicate that 90% of plans purchase some reinsurance (Lewin 1997). Stop-loss, which indemnifies the plan for claims above a deductible (also called an attachment point), is purchased from third-party reinsurers. If plans are not financially at risk for high-cost patients after a deductible, their incentive to demand formal risk adjustment should be reduced. However, because deductibles are often relatively large (as much as $2 million) and stop-loss insurance is commonly expe-rience rated, considerable incentives for plans to compete for good risks remain (Lewin 1997) .
The evidence presented previously suggests the following. First, the number of situations where employees have any choice among health plans in the context of employer-sponsored private insurance is quite limited. Second, where choices are present, employees are only sometimes at risk for the costs of their health plan choices. And third, health plans have opportunities to share risk in a variety of ways, and therefore frequently do not bear the full costs (or gains) of biased selection.
Alternatives to Formal Risk Adjustment: Experience Rating and Benefit Design
A plan that expects its profits to be reduced by adverse selection can choose to bid risk-adjusted premiums in its negotiations with the purchaser. However, the presence of adverse selection under the conditions described earlier is only necessary, but not sufficient, for a plan to seek formal risk adjustment as a solution. Alternative mechanisms for improving the profitability of a contract may be preferable to a plan facing losses due to adverse selection. The primary advantage to these alternatives is that they are less data-and analysis-intensive than formal risk adjustment, which, if it is to be effective, may require a large quantity of employee-specific information and methodological sophistication.
Implicit Experience Rating in Managed Competition
The sponsor function in managed competition, as it is applied to private health insurance arrangements, consists of firms' human resource departments or purchasing coalitions that oversee the conduct of health plans (Enthoven 1988) . In some cases, the sponsor function involves a relatively large bureaucracy that contracts on behalf of many enrollees with many health plans across a substantial number of markets (e.g., the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program [FEHBP] ). In other cases, the sponsor function is played by a rather small human resource department that deals with two or three health plans for the coverage of a modest number of enrollees (200 to 300). The degree of formal structure that governs the process of managed competition can vary enormously, as does the flexibility in the relation between health plans and payers. Thus, some purchasing protocols call for standardized benefits, a formal request for proposals (RFP), submission of bids by potential health plans and a structured negotiation process. Other processes consist of continuous communica-tions and the setting of deadlines for agreeing upon benefit designs, premiums and other plan features. The amount of rigidity in the purchasing system, the design and goals of negotiation, and the amount of communication between sponsors and plans may be very important in determining the demand for formal risk adjustment. If there are a variety of opportunities for health plans to communicate claims experiences to payers, and sufficient flexibility to adjust benefits and premiums in current or future periods, much of the work of formal risk adjustment is done by open enrollment provisions combined with the negotiation process.
Implicit experience rating exists when there is flexibility in the purchasing process that allows for the average premium for a particular plan to be aligned with service costs. Traditionally, experience rating has involved setting premiums for a covered population according to the risk experience of the population with a plan in the previous year. Thus, changes in costs stemming from changing enrollment patterns or other factors were recognized in subsequent contracts, thereby muting selection-related incentives. Under implicit experience rating, the procurement process provides for sufficient flexibility to allow sponsors to adjust premiums so as to avoid windfall gains and losses for plans and the consequent death spirals. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the specific mechanisms that create implicit experience rating in managed competition arrangements.
The premium negotiation process. A 1997 Foster Higgins national sample survey of all U.S. employers with 10 or more employees suggests that the relationship between purchasers and health plans is not the simple arms' length variety that is governed largely by a competitive procurement process (Lo-Sasso et al. 1999) . The survey, which had a 50% response rate and nearly 4,000 responses, reports that about 41% of firms negotiated with plans over premiums. Substantial shares of both self-insured firms and those that purchase insurance engaged in premium negotiations (42% and 38% respectively). A complementary survey conducted by researchers at Northwestern University provides more detailed responses about the purchasing behavior of employers (LoSasso et al. 1999) . The Northwestern survey contacted 178 employers and obtained responses from 73 (a 41% response rate). In that survey, about 50% of the respondents stated that their desire to obtain competitive premiums led them to negotiate with plans. Both surveys suggest that substantial segments of purchasers and plans negotiate premium contracts.
Several well-known purchasers have highly structured procurement processes that use competitive bidding mechanisms to set premiums. These include the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), several state employee benefit systems, and some large employers like Digital (now Compaq). This approach to purchasing typically specifies ''standardized benefits'' upon which bids are made (U.S. GAO 1997) . Benefit standardization does not necessarily mean identical benefits, but rather similar benefits (LoSasso et al. 1999) . Purchasers also announce their intentions regarding the number of contracts to be awarded. There is considerable diversity in practice with respect to exclusion of bidders. Some purchasers announce that they will contract only with a fixed number (usually two to four) of plans, thereby increasing their bargaining power. Bid submission, among larger purchasers, is almost always followed by negotiation over premiums.
Several concerns appear to be at the heart of negotiation. For purchasers, a prime aim of negotiation is to counter bidding strategies by HMOs known as ''shadow pricing.'' Shadow pricing is the practice by many HMOs of setting their premiums just below those of indemnity and preferred provider organization (PPO) plans in the market. In the 1970s and 1980s, after passage of the HMO Act, this practice was frequently encountered in markets where employers paid 90% to 95% of the premium and had to offer an HMO plan as well as an indemnity plan. In the last decade, sponsors often have required plans to justify their premiums.
In recent years, a second concern of sponsors has been the financial state of many health plans. Thus, the justification of bids has also served as an opportunity for payers to avoid under-funding a premium. Purchasers appear to differ somewhat in their willingness to use negotiations to align premiums and costs, often because of a perception that even in the most mature managed care markets (e.g., California), there remains a good deal of ''off-frontier'' production and an ability to realize additional savings. 10 A number of large purchasers therefore primarily use the negotiation process to verify the basis of premium bids and to extract further price concessions. Price concessions can either appear in current price levels or take the form of multiyear agreements that specify rates of increase in future years. It is in purchasing environments where the bidding and negotiation processes are strictly focused on using market power to extract price concessions that one is most likely to observe use of risk adjustment for premiums. Ex-amples of such environments are those constructed by the CalPERS, Gateway Purchasers for Health, and the Pacific Business Group on Health.
The details of the negotiating processes used by a number of large purchasers reveal the opportunities that negotiation offers for aligning costs and premiums particularly as they relate to selection. The GAO (1997) conducted extensive interviews with large firms and purchasing coalitions. The purchasers in the GAO sample reported that analysis of premiums is a key part of the negotiation process. It appears that they analyze spending, claims, and utilization data for their own populations by adjusting for age and sex of employees. They also assess utilization data to determine whether past premiums and current bids can be substantiated. Overall health plan financial and service utilization data also are examined. These data provide purchasers with information that equips them to address selection and its consequences. By analyzing utilization data relative to premiums and also risk adjusting that information as part of the negotiation process, a purchaser can allow for premium changes based on the actuarial experience of the group. Similarly, by taking account of a plan's financial condition and the premium contribution paid on behalf of the population for which a contract is being negotiated, a purchaser knows the economics that may underlie a plan's participation decision in the purchasers' health program. Taken together, the opportunities for communication and the nature of the data used in negotiating premiums capture many of the features of experience rating. Conducting negotiations based on such data analysis and its interpretation may well accomplish as much or more than a plan could reasonably expect from any of the extant risk adjustment systems.
Benefit Design
There are two ways that changes in benefit design or other plan features (such as network size) can address an adverse selection problem from the plan's perspective. First, altering benefit design, given a set of premiums or a historical pattern of enrollment, can substitute for a premium change. The recent experience of the Harvard University employees' health insurance program illustrates one way in which permitting benefit changes, given a fixed premium, allows for aligning premiums and costs. During 1999, one of the largest plans serving Harvard employees and their dependents was losing money and chose to alter the enrollee cost-sharing provisions of its prescription drug benefit. The plan did so unilaterally, within a benefit period, informing Harvard after the fact. Harvard did not insist on a corresponding premium adjustment at the time or subsequently. The impact of the interaction was equivalent to an effective premium increase within the benefit year.
A second way is that changes in plan features can alter the risk profile of enrollees by influencing who chooses a plan. We interviewed an underwriter with a large national managed care company regarding policy toward changing benefit design. He noted that purchasers and plans often adjust benefits in response to data indicating substantial cost differences across plans that appear attributable to biased selection. The argument implicit in his observations was that there are many plan features that are not contractible (e.g., medical necessity criteria) and benefit design features, which are contractible, can be manipulated so as to offset tendencies towards biased selection. He suggested that negotiations often involved actuaries and underwriters, working for both the purchaser and health plans, making alterations in benefit provisions to equalize selection across plans. The advantage of this strategy as compared with formal risk adjustment is clear. Risk-adjusted premiums may be passed along to employees, exacerbating the selection problem through the process of ''adverse retention'' (Cutler and Reber 1998) , that is, driving the lowest-cost enrollees to switch out of the plan. Thus formal risk adjustment may not be a dynamically stable solution to the adverse selection problem. When enrollees pay more to choose higher-cost plans, plans face the threat of a ''death spiral'' (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) with risk-adjusted premiums.
Discussion and Implications
We have examined the demand for formal risk adjustment by health plans and found that current market conditions do not resemble those necessary to predict that formal risk adjustment will be beneficial. Employers seem to be structuring competition for health plans in a different fashion than that conceived by Enthoven (1988) . Few health plans face competition for enrollees and when they do, consumers are frequently insulated from the cost of their plan choices. The exception here is plans that contract with large purchasers and public purchasers. The few examples of formal risk adjustment noted by Keenan et al. (2001) are found in such market environments.
The absence of the market conditions necessary to generate demand for formal risk adjustment begs the question of whether investing in improved risk adjustment is justified to facilitate the implementation of managed competition. That is, could formal risk adjustment improve upon the current market situation if the technology of risk adjustment continued to advance? To answer this question, several issues require further investigation. First, how significant are the gains from a purer form of managed competition likely to be in terms of lower prices, higher quality, and the inherent value of choice to consumers? Second, is selection the key obstacle preventing employers from offering competing plans? The administrative costs of working with multiple plans may, for example, be of greater concern to purchasers. Third, even if selection is a primary obstacle to offering choice, are there labor market issues that prevent employers from adopting risk adjustment? As others have suggested elsewhere (Encinosa and Selden 2001) , employers rationally may sacrifice efficient contracting for health insurance to achieve better labor market outcomes, such as attracting and retaining the most productive workers.
Finally, further study is needed to evaluate empirically the relative costs and benefits of formal risk adjustment compared to the alternatives. Many have argued that the current state of risk adjustment technology is inadequate to correct selection problems (Newhouse 1998) . In situations where there is multiple choice but a high level of communication between purchasers and health plans, then a system of implicit experience rating may serve plans by: 1) better aligning premiums and costs than formal risk adjustment systems like adjusted clinical groups (ACGs) and diagnostic cost groups (DCGs), and 2) reducing the level of risk borne by a plan. The result may be a set of institutions that approximate the mixed payment arrangements proposed as answers to imperfect risk adjusters. Importantly, however, such mixed payment systems may be relatively less efficient than prospectively adjusted payment systems (Newhouse 1996) . Alternatively, plans (and employers) may find changing benefit design or other plan dimensions preferable to either formal risk adjustment or experience rating. Unless purchasers disproportionately subsidize high-risk enrollees, formal risk adjustment and experience rating may result in a spiraling selection problem in which the lowest risk enrollees are driven out of a plan. This alternative clearly has efficiency costs that are due to under-provision of services that would be valued by consumers. Here again, improved risk adjustment could make it possible for plans to offer benefit choices that would be preferable to current offerings, which are restricted by selection concerns.
Notes
This paper was prepared for the conference, ''Private Employers and Risk Adjustment,'' held February 8-9, 2000 , and hosted by the Industry Studies Program in the Department of Economics at Boston University. The conference was sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and the Management Sciences Group of the Department of Veterans Affairs. 1 If, for example, health plans exhibited risk aversion, then they also would value formal risk adjustment for its ability to reduce the variance of profitability. The value of risk adjustment, while greater at each point, still would be a function of the conditions we lay out subsequently leaving our analysis unchanged. 2 Because we are considering only the demand by health plans for risk adjustment, we will not address those situations where selection may be costly to an employer, but not to a plan. While biased selection may occur when a plan is paid an administrative fee that is independent of claims costs, it has little effect on health plan profits and hence we anticipate no significant behavioral responses. 3 One possible exception is if plans enter into multiyear contracts and experience changes in the enrolled population. Under those conditions, there might be some demand for risk adjustment. 4 We agree with Glazer and McGuire's (2001) argument that open-enrollment provisions effectively prevent plans from discrimination in enrollment on an individualized basis.
5 Recall that Keenan et al. (2001) found that only about 1% of contracts are risk adjusted. 6 We specifically distinguish choice of carriers as the relevant measure of choice here. About twice as many employers offer choice of product offered by a single carrier, but this does not create the same magnitude of a selection problem from a plan's perspective. 7 The percentage of employers with a given type of plan offering and the percentage of employees who are offered those plans are computed as a share of all (private or public) employers and employees rather than employers that offer any coverage. 8 It is worth noting that Morrisey and Jensen (1997) report that the number of small employers offering choices to their employees declined to less than 5% in the late 1990s. 9 Because of the possibility of spousal coverage, many employees may have effectively more choice of health plans. Similarly, employees may choose jobs on the basis of health plan offerings. However, neither of these phenomena should lead to a demand for risk adjustment on the part of health plans. Rather, if some employers attract sicker workers or spouses, they will have to pay higher total premiums based on their aggregate risk profile. 10 The GAO (1997) reports on an interview with the executive director of a purchasing coalition, who states: ''Plans won't focus on quality if employers aren't tough on price. Nothing breeds innovation like necessity.''
